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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: Bioterrorism events are actually a subset of disasters for which the public 
health community is responsible to be prepared, but they are also a new and unique 
problem requiriug different and emerging planning for adequate response. This paper 
explores critical needs at our present national level ofbioterrorism preparedness, 
identifies some steps to be taken, and addresses some issues currently being or still to be 
addressed by states. A case study of one state's bioterrorism response initiatives is 
utilized as an example of successful integrated state-wide preparation, evaluated in the 
context of the CDC's current guidelines, and is presented as a model for potential further 
application. 
Research Methods: A search of multiple databases was utilized to identifY relevant 
literature on critical needs for disaster preparedness and identifY bioterrorism 
preparedness and response initiatives as was a reference review of pertinent articles for 
further useful information. Input for the case study was collected during a recent field 
practicum experience. 
Louisiana Case Study: Louisiana's bioterrorism response initiatives are explored under 
the categories of Organization/Planning, Education, Public Safety, and Health. Integrated 
organization of state bioterrorism response participants with a designated chain of 
command, broad scope educational efforts and utilization of exercising, communications 
improvements and health efforts and are presented as examples of successful responses to 
the CDC's guidance on critical and enhanced capacities set forth as goals in bioterrorism 
preparedness for individual states' action. 
Conclusions/Lessons Learned: Concerted efforts to bring multiple levels of government 
and the public up to speed in bioterrorism awareness and preparedness is a successful 
approach to meet designated goals as set forth by the CDC. Planning and exercising 
developed plans are critical to achieving appropriate levels ofbioterrorism preparedness 
as they establish patterns of successful action and build trust and a sense of teamwork, 
critical to efficient response efforts. The issue of how to prepare our nation, state by 
state, for a bioterrorism attack is extremely complex and rapidly changing, but the 
successes of Louisiana's initiatives towards bioterrorism preparedness represent a model 
for continued improvement by medical and public health communities. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT 
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
LRN Laboratory Response Network 
NPS National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
Nlli National Institutes of Health 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency ~ 
;:-
EMS Emergency Medical System l 
HAZMAT Hazardous Material I MPH Masters in Public Health iii 
HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration r 
EOC Emergency Operations Center 
LAN Local Area Network 
GIS Geographic Information Systems 
EOC Emergency Operations Center 
SNS Strategic National Stockpile 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disasters are defined as emergencies of significant severity and magnitude that the 
resulting deaths, injuries and damage to property or infrastructure cannot be effectively 
managed by the utilization of routine procedures or resources. 1 Disasters have 
historically included natural occurrences such as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, 
earthquakes, droughts, volcanic eruptions and epidemics, all of which pose their own 
unique set of risks that manifest in the form of negative impacts on the public's health. 
Local, regional and national public health authorities have the responsibility for 
maintaining the health of a community following such disasters. Public health 
professionals bring multidisciplinary talents and perspectives to the effort, contributing to 
disaster planning and preparedness as well as disaster response, which are actually 
extensions of their normal activities in maintaining a community's health. It is the role of 
public health officials to communicate with non-health members of the community 
including other response personnel and elected officials who may have little or no public 
health knowledge. Information such as health advisories prior to disasters and post event 
health assessments post is critical to appropriate planning activities and key to an 
adequate response. Resource problems following past U.S. disasters have occurred due 
to poor planning in the utilization or distribution of capabilities and supplies rather than 
from a lack of them and it is up to the public health world to ensure that appropriate input 
into the areas of planning, prevention, post-assessment and recovery to ensure that 
maximum preparedness, and thus responsive action, is achieved not just for previously 
known threats, but for emerging ones as well. 1 In recent history we have had to 
modifY our preparedness for familiar natural disasters to include manmade ones such as 
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chemical spills, nuclear leaks, and accidental release ofbiological agents. Most recently, 
we have added the purposeful release of biological agents or toxins as acts of terrorism 
which presents special challenges and concerns. In response to this threat, the list of 
public health roles is long, but includes developing protocols for collaboration between 
different levels of public health authorities, the health care system, and federal agencies. 
Other necessary tasks include establishing criteria for diagnosing and treating emerging 
infections, activating surveillance systems to quickly identify disease outbreaks 
potentially associated with bioterrorism attacks, implementing a Health Alert Network 
for rapid communication, expanding lab capacity for rapid detection and identification of 
potential pathogens, educating organizations and responders needed in the event of an 
attack, resolving legal issues related to public health authority in emergencies, and 
developing contingency plans for post-event response.1 
Anthrax is considered one of if not the most likely bioterrorism agent for a number of 
reasons including the relative ease of acquiring and producing it in sufficient quantities, 
its stability and potential for aerosol delivery. Anthrax has long been recognized as an 
occupational disease, usually acquired either by people working around natural animal 
reservoirs such as farmers and veterinarians or in workers otherwise exposed to products 
of animals such as textile or leather workers. With only a few exceptions, it has 
historically been a disease of relatively minor clinical and epidemiological importance, 
usually occurring in single cases or small clusters of the cutaneous form and only rarely 
inhalational (pulmonary) anthrax. It is now very uncommon in developed nations since 
the introduction of an acellular anthrax vaccine in the early 1960s and modern veterinary 
medicine has controlled the disease in livestock. 2 
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This picture was dramatically and likely forever redrawn in October, 2001 with the 
intentional release of Bacillus anthracis in a bioterrorism event targeting publicly 
recognized media and political personalities-an experience with invaluable lessons 
which can be utilized to project what we may expect in the future. Unlike the shocking 
and very visual terrorist attacks of the prior month, this one gave few early indications of 
trouble, yet before the resultant outbreak was contained, 23 cases of anthrax were 
reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), including five deaths, 
and an estimated 32,000 potentially exposed victims had been prescribed prophylactic 
antibiotic therapy. Most cases and the vast majority of those treated prophylactically 
were assessed to have been exposed, though two cases were not clearly linked with 
specific exposures and risk factors were never confirmed which further complicates the 
picture as it means that even those without obvious sources of exposure may be at risk in 
such events3• 
The effects of the above intentional anthrax release incident were very different from 
those of a conventional crisis. For example, most of the patients were "concerned and 
potentially exposed," with few actually critically ill victims. Otherwise known as the 
"worried well," a rather misleading term, as, at least some of them had the potential to 
become ill. Nevertheless, they sought care in large numbers from the health-care system, 
looking for reassurance, information and intervention for prevention. But patients and 
the public were disturbed to discover that, in many instances, health-care providers were 
ill prepared to provide those services and the medical community was far from presenting 
a united front when it came to making recommendations. Unlike the emergency medical 
service's gnidelines and trauma protocols which drive other mass casualty scenarios, no 
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official protocols existed or were distributed to guide risk assessment for individuals with 
concerns regarding exposure. Messages broadcast by the media sometimes gave 
inaccurate or conflicting information. Unfortunately, there was no efficient, proactive, 
community-wide incident management system available to implement that could 
organize the varied response agencies into a coordinated system. 4 
Potential exposures to bioterrorism agents require a complete paradigm shift in the 
way we have typically approached disease surveillance and prevention interventions. 
Previously, with natural disease outbreaks or exposure, it was possible to scientifically 
approach risk assessment and respond as deemed necessary with interventions such as 
exposure control measures and prevention tools like pre-exposure vaccination for high ' I risk individuals. With the advent of this new threat via various possible delivery methods 
in extremely unpredictable scenarios, we are left in an environment with a very high 
degree of uncertainty in which to protect those who may be at risk. For example, 
systematic risk assessment and routine monitoring for exposure of at-risk workers or the 
general public and therefore timely pre-exposure interventions may be realistically 
precluded by both cost and the logistics of such a task, not to mention the associated 
potential health risks. It is likely that the foreseeable future will involve post-exposure 
risk assessment and recommendations for interventions only after an outbreak has been 
identified, though in specific situations pre-exposure vaccination may be indicated. 
Further complicating the situation is the fact that response can no longer be effectively 
confined to medical professionals such as epidemiologists, health care providers and 
occupational scientists, but instead has far-reaching societal implications. Mobilization 
from participants nationwide is required including the added involvement of law 
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enforcement personnel, criminal investigators and primary responder personnel, who will 
likely be dealing with potential occupational exposure themselves, perhaps with little 
training or experience at least until appropriate levels of preparedness can be achieved. 
There is also the concern of occupational risk in the form of adverse effects from 
interventions such as drug reactions to prophylactic antibiotics or vaccination. In 
addition to all these potential sources of confusion and stress is the required goal of 
protecting the general public from non-occupational exposures and preventing disruption 
of normal societal functioning, for example in the form of disrupting basic services such 
as transportation, mail delivery, or health care access if the system were to be 
overwhehned. Appropriate planning and the development of coordinated effective 
responses to all of these considerations are necessary before we should consider ourselves 
prepared to meet this daunting challenge. 
OBJECTIVES 
Though the significant challenges presented by events of October, 2001 prompted a 
massive response from the U.S. public health system headed by the CDC in coordination 
with its federal, state and local health agency partners5, the experience most importantly 
served to highlight the glaring gaps in our preparedness to prevent or control a repeat 
attack with anthrax or another bio-agent. It is our present level of preparedness and 
exploration of the steps which need to be taken and issues currently being or still to be 
addressed that will be examined in this paper. A case study of one state's bioterrorism 
response initiatives will be utilized as an example of one successful approach to 
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integrated state-wide preparation. Preparedness initiatives will be evaluated in tbe 
context of the CDC's current guidelines and offered as models for application elsewhere. 
The research methods used to identify literature relevant to this purpose were an Ovid 
search of the following databases: Medline (1966 to present), CINAHL, Premedline, all 
EMB databases and the Cochrane Database of Systemic Reviews utilizing tbe key 
phrases "anthrax exposure" and "bioterrorism response" to identify critical needs in 
disaster preparedness and identify bioterrorism preparedness and response initiatives. A 
reference review of pertinent articles also generated a variety of types of documents and 
sources for review and inclusion as pertinent. Input for tbe case study was gathered 
during field experience at tbe state of Louisiana's Office of Public Health Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response. 
CURRENT CAP ABILITY 
On October 41h, 2001, just days after the tragic events of September II th, the CDC 
confirmed the first U.S. case of inhalational anthrax in 25 years and transitioned from an 
era of table-top bioterrorism exercises and usher in a new one of real world response. The 
complexity of the investigation and response following tbe attack proved challenging 
even for experienced field epidemiologists. At state and federal levels, "incident 
command" style management oftbe crisis was utilized to address tbe constant emergence 
of new information, oversee and direct multiple concurrent public health investigations 
and taskings, and to communicate effectively throughout. 6 But despite utilization of this 
method, it proved to have growing pains and inefficiencies. There were distinct 
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integration issues and communication was not always coordinated between agencies or 
with the public. For example, this particular incident management process narrowly 
averted releasing three unintentionally conflicting sets of recommendations for 
discontinuing prophylaxis-from three different jurisdictional sources.4 
The major hurdle to this type of response in the public health and medical arenas 
comes not only from the multiple agencies involved, but also from their differing 
individual goals or roles, historic or perceived, and the consequential lack of operational 
coordination of common goals at appropriate levels. There is a wide range of for-profit, 
not-for-profit, local, state and federal medical organizations, which all need to be brought 
under the same umbrella to orchestrate a defined, seamless and efficient operational 
response. Unlike emergency service responses such as fire response or the military 
system (with imbedded medical assets) which have inherent line command authority 
(pre-designated legal "command and control"), the medical response system as a whole 
defies being commanded as many of the key players are non-governmental. Instead they 
must be managed and therefore motivated to participate in an incident management 
effort, complicated by such issues as the perceived competence of the system and the 
information it provides, assurance of appropriate compensation, and confidence that 
participation will result in an overall gain for the organization or network involved.4 
The key to efficient incident management is appropriate information management 
which incorporates information collection, analysis and dissemination. Executed 
properly, it is an active planning process permitting proactive development of response 
objectives, strategies, and priorities based on evolving incident data and information. 
This process relies on effective communication which is actually a subset of overall 
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information management and involves the actual conveying of appropriate information in 
its various forms and levels to different populations needing it to direct their actions. 
Ideally, communication activities are directed by a well constructed plan taking into 
account technical capabilities.4 
But despite the growing pains experienced with the incident of October, 2001, it was 
still a far more coordinated effort that it might otherwise have been if some forward 
planning had not already been accomplished. Investigation into a series of anthrax-
related threats and hoaxes in 1998 helped lay the groundwork for this response. 5 Such 
contingency style operations date back to plans to mitigate bioterrorism related anthrax 
outbreaks generated from the August 1998, CDC-hosted "Workshop on Improving Public 
Health Response to Possible Acts ofBioterrorism." This workshop brought together 
state and local health departments, the U.S. Departments of Defense and Justice and 
public health professional organizations to explore means of improving public health 
preparedness. Two significant investments came out of this effort which proved to be 
key components in the 2001 attack; the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) for 
Bioterrorism and the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS--now the Strategic 
National Stockpile). Both were in place prior to the 2001 outbreak.6 
The LRN was a recommendation of the 1998 workshop's "Diagnosis Working Group" 
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made up with members of the current Association for Public Health Laboratories and the ' 
CDC. It is made up of a tiered system of labs with categorized capacities ranging from 
the lowest tier, A, to the highest in the pyramid, D. Based on data gleaned from older 
methods, procedures for identification of B. anthracis and other potential bioterrorism 
agents were either validated, developed or redeveloped and generated protocols were 
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incorporated into standard lab manuals. Testing reagents were also standardized, mass 
produced and distributed to labs and training on methods was conducted. Enhanced 
capabilities for specialized or confirmatory sample testing were established at the CDC 
and other select advanced labs. Serological testing capability was developed for 
diagnostic purposes. In the acute phase of the 200 I outbreak alone, LRN labs tested over 
121,700 specimens for anthrax, most from environmental sampling. Without this 
immense demonstrated surge capability, the outcome of response is likely to have been 
much less successful than it proved to be. The other post-workshop investment, the 
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, proved its worth as well. During the 2001 outbreak, 
the NPS team delivered antibiotics (over 3.75 million tablets), vaccine, clinical and L 
environmental samples and anthrax isolates and also transported epidemiologists, 
' laboratory scientists, pathologists and specialized research teams. 
6 
But the groundwork laid after the 1998 "false alarms" did not stop with the formation 
of the LRN and NPS. Guidelines for risk assessment and postexposure prophylaxis were 
developed and coordination with first responders and law enforcement was emphasized. 
~-
Efforts were launched to revise immunization recommendations including the use of 
vaccine for postexposure prophylaxis. The events of 2001 brought additional guidelines 
on investigating and responding to anthrax exposures including the issues of clinical 
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testing, use of prophylactic antibiotics, closing of potentially contaminated buildings and 
postexposure treatment options and the expansion of vaccination recommendations to 
include guidance on immunizing at-risk populations.5 
This last issue has generated rather significant controversy particularly with regard to 
the immunization of large numbers of military personnel in preparation for potential 
12 
bioterrorism attacks in a forward deployed setting. Critics argue that such practice is not 
based on truly assessed individual risk as it is military policy to vaccinate prior to any 
deployment rather than in response to any specifically identified threat. They further 
charge that the Department of Defense's use is "off-label" as the currently licensed 
vaccine is not approved for protection against inhalation anthrax (the most likely and 
dangerous transmission route in a biological attack) since the original field trials 
conducted for the vaccine's approval did not have sufficient cases of inhalation anthrax to 
assess efficacy against this form of the disease.7 Critics claim that such use puts military 
members at unnecessary risk, that is not only involuntary, but carries undetermined rates 
and types of adverse effects, and may well provide no protection from disease. They 
believe that the mandatory use of anthrax vaccine by the armed forces should be 
suspended until further research is conducted as it represents a double standard in regards 
to recommendations that run counter to those for other potentially at-risk groups.8 
Military members themselves have expressed concern over the potential adverse effects 
and uncertain efficacy of the anthrax vaccine. While noncompliance is minimized (as 
compared to those who must take it voluntarily) in this particular population due to the 
high degree of authority placed over it by its employer( s ), the issue of non-adherence in 
general is by no means a trivial one. Anthrax vaccination is not currently recommended 
for pre-exposure prophylaxis in first responders, but similar recommendations for 
vaccination against smallpox have encountered some very vocal opposition. The 
California Nurses Association has publicly announced its position that California 
hospitals should not participate in the smallpox program due to member and patient 
safety concerns as well as concerns for compensation in the event of consequences from 
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adverse effects. 9 Other healthcare workers throughout the country are refusing the 
smallpox vaccine for similar reasons, citing concerns over compensation if work is 
missed and the perception that an attack is very unlikely. 10 These examples should serve 
to remind us that such recommendations need to be carefully thought out before release 
so that the public health community is pre-prepared to answer questions and concerns 
with well articulated risk assessment information and logical thought processes to defend 
their decisions when interfacing with populations at risk; otherwise the effectiveness of 
prevention efforts may fall far short of success and waste valuable resources in the 
process. And the need to provide timely, accurate information is not restricted to those 
exposed occupationally, who may well have greater levels of understanding of medical 
issues as compared to the public. The public itself will need to be brought "into the fold" 
in an atmosphere of trust and complete disclosure to earn and maintain their confidence 
and cooperation in the face ofbioterrorism response efforts, particularly if that involves 
community vaccination campaigns. Assessment of the September 11th 2001 incident and 
the subsequent anthrax release indicate that the public may well be capable of effective 
participation in both decision-making and prevention campaigns provided they are 
entrusted with adequate information, though reactions were complex and results were far 
from conclusive. 11 
Post -exposure prophylaxis is another area desperately in need of further information to 
answer key decision-making questions. Though not all bioterrorism agents can be 
combated with this method, it is applicable to anthrax which has been repeatedly assessed 
as the one of if not the most likely agent to be utilized for bioterrorism attacks. As the 
2001 anthrax event evolved and the possible risk to postal workers became evident, the 
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U.S. Postmaster General, in consultation with the CDC, recommended initiating anthrax 
prophylaxis at mail distribution centers from which contaminated letters were delivered 
in the District of Columbia, New Jersey and New York City. The effort was coordinated 
by the U.S. Health and Human Services' Office of Emergency Preparedness and involved 
the mobilization of five disaster medial assistance teams, the U.S. Public Health Service 
and CDC personnel to evaluate 7,076 patients over a 68 hour period.12 Despite this 
massive effort, it is still unclear what specific risks were faced by these employees and 
what consequences would have resulted if intervention had not been initiated as no real 
evidence exists attesting to the efficacy of this intervention. Adherence to post-exposure 
prophylactic regimes is another complicated issue. At follow-up one week after this 
antibiotic campaign, a convenience sample of 1,500 patients indicated that only 15% of 
all employees acknowledged taking the initial 1 0-day course of antibiotics provided.12 
The use of these drugs is also not without risk of adverse effects. In a similar antibiotic 
distribution campaign during the 2001 outbreak, of the 5,343 people taking at least one 
dose of prescribed antibiotic, 57% reported adverse effects within the first 60 days of use 
and little information is available on the long-term use of these medications. 13 
FUTURE CAP ABILITY 
Despite the enhancement of capabilities following the 1998 brainstorming session, in 
the 2001 outbreak, the risk to employees of the Washington D.C. Brentwood postal 
facility from contaminated envelopes in transit was not recognized in time to prevent 
illness in four employees, two of whom died as a result. The previous decision-making 
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on the part of the CDC was subsequently criticized by manl, but it can be used as a 
constructive example to illustrate the huge degree of uncertainty faced not only in this 
outbreak, but what will likely be faced in any future scenarios. Decisions regarding the 
Brentwood facility were based on epidemiological observations made in Florida and New 
York where no disease occurred in postal workers. Speculation has suggested that the 
differential risk can be explained by varying formulations and aerosolization potentials of 
anthrax powders in different mailings. This variation is a significant factor in 
bioterrorism response; in naturally occurring disease, once risk is determined, it tends to 
remain stable, but with a bioterrorism attack, risk may well be not only inconsistent, but 
manipulated by the perpetrator or affected by other factors such as the environment. 6 
While the 2001 anthrax outbreak provided an invaluable experience, enabling us to 
better prepare for, recognize and respond to possible future attacks, it also served to 
highlight that much more work needs to be done and that that we simply cannot afford to 
be complacent. The attack was relatively small, did not involve multiple agents or modes 
of delivery, a drug resistant organism, animal or global transmission. The surge capacity 
of the health care system was not truly tested and unlike some of the other potential 
bioterrorism agents, anthrax is easily isolated in clinical labs and neither person-to-person 
nor vector-borne transmission posed a risk. 14 Many questions remain and further 
research is needed to determine the lowest infectious dose and the risk associated with 
exposure to low levels of anthrax-containing aerosols, define what constitutes an 
exposure for which antibiotic prophylaxis is warranted (especially considering potential 
adverse drug effects), and determine the degree to which spores create a residual 
environmental risk after initial contamination. It is also urgently necessary that we seek 
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to develop improved rapid environmental testing methods and identify optimal 
decontamination means for a variety of contaminated settings. 5 
After these lessons learned during the 2001 outbreak investigation, several areas 
requiring additional research to improve public health response had been identified, but 
still required refinement. The disciplines represented and their specific associated 
expertises are very diverse and encompass multiple agencies and levels of government. 
To address these issues, identify priorities and focus research efforts, the CDC convened 
a meeting in December, 2001, consisting of two sessions and attended by representatives L 
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from the CDC, the FDA, Nlli, the EPA, the Departments of Defense and Justice, the U.S. 
Postal Service, state health departments and others. After background presentations, 
working groups met to develop future top three priorities on specific anthrax topics. 15 
For evaluation of B. anthracis containing powders or substances, top priorities were 
identified as 1) rapid analysis to assess particle size distribution and matrix characteristics 
2) measurements of different anthrax powders' ability to reaerosolize and 3) development 
of an in vitro human cell culture model to study cutaneous anthrax. For the topic of 
epidemiologic investigation, they generated the priorities 1) analysis of individual host 
infection factors 2) exposure reconstruction and risk characterization and 3) review of 
unexamined or previously unavailable (e.g. classified) animal data related to dose 
response. Under environmental assessment, top priorities were 1) validation and 
standardization of sampling and sample analysis techniques, 2) evaluation of disease risk 
in contaminated environments and 3) determination of risk ofreaerosolization. For 
anthrax surveillance, they were 1) expanded veterinary surveillance, 2) use of alternate 
data sources for surveillance in bioterrorism events and 3) design and validation of 
17 
surveillance systems to detect complex contamination or release scenarios. Diagnosis 
priorities were 1) identification of the earliest detectable event in the range from exposure 
to disease via use of animal models 2) evaluation of antigen detection assays and 3) 
development of a catalog of anthrax subtypes. Treatment priorities were 1) investigate 
the role of immune and anti-toxin regimens 2) investigate further antibiotic therapies in 
animal models and 3) develop animal models. Postexposure prophylaxis priorities were 
1) evaluation of adherence and barriers to it, plus adverse events associated with long t-
term antimicrobial use 2) pediatric vaccine safety and immunogenicity studies and 3) 
animal challenge studies to optimize human postexposure prophylaxis. Lastly, for 
remediation, the top priorities were 1) evaluation of remediation agents 2) development 
of risk-based decision trees for sampling and remediation and 3) reaerosolization studies 
and agent- and space-specific scenarios. Together these priorities begin to define a 
framework for additional research efforts to improve our public health readiness 
posture. 15 
The investigation launched in North Carolina in an attempt to rule out exposure there 
in the first inhalation anthrax case in the 2001 event revealed opportunities for 
improvement of field operations. Case definitions, surveillance methods, data collection 
forms and educational/informational material had to be developed ad hoc. These 
deficiencies resulted in delays in surveillance, uncertainties as to the effectiveness of and 
person-hours required by case-finding methods and data collection inefficiencies. 
Agencies and investigators had not previously worked together in many cases and there 
was much unfamiliarity regarding partners' capabilities. Lastly, much time was spent 
educating health care providers and public health personnel about the epidemiology and 
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clinical presentation of anthrax. All of these findings indicate that, had the system been 
faced with many cases, it may have rapidly been overwhelmed. In response, North 
Carolina and other states, in response to lessons learned and gnidance provided by the 
CDC, are in the process of taking steps to better prepare for future bioterrorism attacks. 
Efforts include the development of standard protocols, data collection instruments, 
informational documents adaptable to various scenarios to speed response and prevent 
omissions, the establishment of state and regional teams trained for bioterrorism response 
i-
and the development of statewide Health Alert Networks to rapidly communicate, via 
multiple electronic means, health alerts to hospitals, health care providers, public health 
and law enforcement officials. Educational efforts are also being directed toward health I professionals to improve their knowledge of potential biological agents.16 Additionally, 
states are in the process of ensuring that antibiotic distribution centers are designated and 
operational plans put into place. Designs for the operational management of such centers 
are being evaluated to determine what performance levels can be anticipated and which 
staffing arrangements are most efficient to maintain long term delivery capability. 
Cutting edge teclmology in the form of discrete event simulation modeling is being 
utilized to help assess how best to design such public health infrastructure. 17 This tool 
has also been applied to calculate the effects of various biological agent attacks, 
estimating such parameters as average incubation period, mortality rates with and without 
planned interventions, secondary transmission rates with and without interventions and 
the mean duration of illness. 18 
Such forward thinking and continued research on the national level is the kind of pro-
active response that needs to be part of our evolving preparedness to ensure we are 
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capable to meet whatever challenge the future holds. These efforts are a partial list, but 
represent an array of the multiple levels and arenas which may be in the process of 
further development or research. The CDC's role is to oversee these research efforts on a 
national level, then take the resulting information as it becomes available and incorporate 
it into evolving specific focus areas or recommended protocols, for example, which are 
subsequently pushed down to individual states for action. Using one state's efforts to 
meet their recommendations for preparedness can be instructive to not only highlight 
successful efforts, but also identify lessons learned and potential areas to be improved. 
The following input for case study was collected during a recent field practicum 
experience and is not all inclusive of Louisiana's preparedness efforts. 
CASE STUDY: Louisiana's Bioterrorism Preparedness Initiatives 
Following the events of September and October, 2001, the bioterrorism response 
function in Louisiana was transitioned from a "subuuit" or responsibility of the 
Epidemiology Department to a freestanding Bioterrorism Response and Disaster 
Preparedness office reporting directly to the Louisiana State Health Director with a 
current annual operating budget of approximately $20 million including both state and 
federal funds, matched and otherwise. This step resulted in a capability that permits 
"one-stop" shopping for other agencies or functions seeking services, reporting or 
coordination on bioterrorism preparedness or emergency response issues and provides an 
invaluable streamlined means to establish advance working relationships. Efforts in 
preparedness for emergency response have been aggressive, rapid, multi-focal and can be 
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organized into the following categories for presentation; organization/planning, 
education, public safety and health. 
Organization/Planning 
The multidisciplinary team approach is the model set forth as the way of the future by 
bringing a varied array of skill sets and expertise together to maximize a response to an 
unpredictable threat. This approach has shown promise in many health care arenas in this 
age of rapid change and it has shown early signs of success in the area ofbioterrorism 
preparedness as well. A visionary multidisciplinary team formulated by Louisiana for 
Bioterrorism Response and Disaster Preparedness, is lead by an MPH with prior military 
experience in public health and bioterrorism preparedness and made up of an emergency 
room nurse assigned to strategic national stockpile issues, two law enforcement personnel 
in the deputy director position and in charge of plans and operations. This core of key 
personnel is augmented with a public relations staff member dedicated to the office, an 
education and training representative, computer systems support (also responsible for· 
maintaining and expanding the Health Alert Network and recall systems), a dedicated 
budget and grant management person, and a national guard liaison. Other expertise is 
achieved through the creative and financially efficient use of intern positions with 
training and experience in environmental issues and management. This purposefully 
mixed palette of personnel with their sometimes vastly different experiences, 
perspectives and training has, nevertheless, pulled itself together to form a cohesive team 
with a distinct esprit de corps and sense of single purpose. 
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Also contributing to a delineated "chain of command" in Louisiana which is relatively 
rare, if not unique, is the organization of the state into public health regions (vs. parish or 
county health departments) which fall directly under the state health jurisdiction (legal 
authority). Many. states have somewhat autonomous county health networks which fall 
under their respective states' jurisdiction only under certain circumstances or for specific 
requirements, somewhat complicating a coordinated response. Louisiana's location in a 
high hurricane threat area and a resulting need for a strong disaster preparedness response 
including public health assets was perhaps the impetus for this organization, but whatever L 
the reason, this organization is poised for what is likely to be a more efficient 
bioterrorism response. Military operations have long shown success with a clear cut L 
chain of command where authority is pre-designated and recognized by all participants. J 
Ironing out differences of opinions between independent jurisdictions in the midst of 
crisis does not lend itself to efficient decision making or response action. 
In addition to a delineated command structure, a well defined ')oint" or unified 
incident command system is necessary to ensure a coordinated response from multiple 
agencies such as emergency management, law enforcement, public health authorities, 
EMS, medical facilities, fire departments, or HAZMAT response. Louisiana has taken 
significant steps toward this end by breaking out of a traditional emergency management 
paradigm to establish response regions with standardized organization and operations and 
has thereby built an extended network. While other states have strived or continue to be 
in transition toward a statewide unified command structure that supports the CDC's goal 
of interagency collaboration and "total force response capacity,"19 Louisiana has 
succeeded in achieving this goal by taking several critical actions. The state Office of 
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Emergency Management is organizationally placed under the Louisiana Army National 
Guard and, as such, falls under the command of the Adjutant General and therefore 
within a military chain of command. The state police system is similar, being a 
paramilitary organization with its own clearly recognizable command structure. Lastly, 
the Public Health Assistant Secretary has advocated and endorsed a chain of command 
that mirrors the above major players in incident response. While it does not utilize a 
formal "rank structure," it nevertheless recognizes the Regional Public Health Medical 
Director as a direct counterpart to the state police troop commander and the regional 
National Guard commander. State healthcare facilities and the EMS have followed suit 
by designating regional coordinators to complete a response infrastructure, absolutely I critical to a strong, efficient and coordinated local response. By designating specific lead 
agents for each piece of the response puzzle in each region, all of them a recognizable j 
counterpart and "equals on the playing field," the way is paved for an efficient team 
response. Additionally, in the event a significantly expanded scope of response is 
required, such as one encompassing several regions or even statewide, the operating and 
reporting procedures are already in place, standardized, and familiar to all players. The 
resulting response team may increase in size (multiple regional players) and overall 
direction may shift to the state level, but overall operational actions remain unchanged. 
Once a cultural shift is made from more traditional emergency response infrastructure 
and plans, challenging though this process can be, the benefits of a coordinated joint 
response are well worth the effort. If alternative forms of organization in other states 
prove to be a hindrance to response or preparedness activities, it might well be 
advantageous to explore Louisiana's example of success for utilization elsewhere. 
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Lastly, Louisiana has chosen to utilize standardized public health contingency 
response plans incorporating both templates and expertise borrowed from military and 
law enforcement fields each with a long history of primary response planning. Interface 
with team members who bring a military medical planning background to the table 
helped to fill in the experience gaps of a law enforcement contingency planner charged 
with drafting plans for public health emergency operations; yet another example of 
capitalizing on the immense benefits of having a multidisciplinary team. The state public 
health plan was designed with the flexibility to alter the team makeup as dictated by the 
specific circumstances of the contingency. These detailed contingency plans were also 
disseminated to regional and parish levels to serve as templates for local response 
planning. 
Education 
Until the recent media blitz surrounding the anthrax attack, the term bioterrorism was 
far from a household word recognized by and concerning the average citizen. 
Bioterrorism issues have historically dwelled in the realm of military planners with 
concerns of attacks on overseas battlefields until the unfolding of recent events put the 
nation on a steep learning curve in efforts to prevent or be prepared for future events. 
Education of multiple levels of responders, elected officials, public health officials and 
the public is critical to maximum preparedness. The CDC's Focus Area G, Education 
and Training outline requirements to "ensure that state and local health agencies have the 
capacity to (a) assess the training needs of key public health professionals, infectious 
disease specialists, emergency department personnel, and other healthcare (including 
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mental health) providers in preparedness for and response to bioterrorism, other 
outbreaks of infectious disease, and other public health threats and emergencies, and (b) 
ensure effective provision of needed education and training to key target audiences 
through multiple channels, including Centers for Public Health Preparedness, other 
schools of public health, schools of medicine, other academic institutions, healthcare 
professionals, CDC, HRSA and other sources."19 Louisiana has tackled this goal through 
multiple efforts aimed at health care providers, law enforcement personnel, public health 
team members and the public. They have evaluated multiple commercially offered 
education packages for state health care workers designed for on-line skills training with 
an incorporated tracking system for completed learning units. The system( s) offers 
multiple training levels of information for various responders; awareness, operational, 
and technical. Funds have been allocated and contracts are in the process of being 
negotiated to provide an organized means to offer and track appropriate training for the 
large number of health care responders throughout the state. It is a first large step only, 
however, as availability of training alone does not ensure its completion; as that requires 
a commitment at local and regional levels to set aside the necessary time and enforce the 
requirements to complete training. 
In the arena of law enforcement training, Louisiana has launched a joint training 
initiative aimed at providing bioterrorism awareness to law enforcement personnel from 
throughout the state. They have capitalized on multidisciplinary assets to deliver a 
comprehensive, level-appropriate training program aimed at bringing bioterrorism 
awareness to operational/responder level (vs. administrative) police officers from around 
the state. Expertise was utilized from multiple sources including bioterrorism 
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preparedness personnel for strategic national (pharmaceutical) stockpile program 
information, the state epidemiologist for bioterrorism agents, diseases and basic medical 
response principles and national guard personnel for disaster contingency operations 
concepts. The information was well received by law enforcement officers and feedback 
from participating students indicated that they felt the information presented had greatly 
increased their knowledge on a subject which had previously been quite lacking. They 
felt much more prepared for a potential bioterrorism incident, in which they would likely 
be required to actively participate if it occurred locally in their area and they expressed 
confidence that they had a solid grasp of appropriate command and control concepts and 
of other agencies or individuals to contact for information or notification if necessary. 
Louisiana has made significant inroads into testing current contingency plans by 
systematically planning for, funding and executing both tabletop and field exercises to 
test interactions and response from the key response arenas of public health, law 
enforcement, disaster preparedness and the local or regional medical community. 
Training has been delivered via a contracted service which set up the scenario, facilitated 
exercise operations, then delivered and received feedback via a group after-action round 
table as well as in a written report format which outlined strengths and lessons learned. 
The process resulted in a positive learning experience with good participation and an 
expressed sense of urgency from players .. Ultimately as different parishes and regions are 
brought up to speed with such exercises, a state-wide field exercise is envisioned to test 
large scale activity which would tie up many more resources and perhaps test the 
independence of different parishes or regions as state or neighboring resources previously 
relied upon are rationed or utilized elsewhere. The state is moving toward becoming 
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competent in responding to either large or small scale incidents and bringing all of their 
individual parishes and regions to a comfortable level of preparedness via encouraging 
the development and testing oflocal and regional plans, mirroring those being put into 
place at the state level. 
Lastly, Louisiana has chosen to launch a public awareness media campaign utilizing 
purchased newspaper and magazine advertising space as well as billboard advertising and 
pamphlet distribution. It was with careful consideration toward the public piece of the 
education effort (as well as preparedness for incident response) that Louisiana's 
Bioterrorism office included a dedicated public relations staff member in its ranks. 
L 
Public Safety I 
f 
' The CDC's Focus Area E, Health Alert Network/Communications and Information 
Technology, requires that systems be put into place that "enable state and local public 
health agencies to establish and maintain a network that will (a) support exchange of key 
information and training over the Internet by linking public health and private partners on 
a 24/7 basis; (b) provide for rapid dissemination of public health advisories to the news 
media and the public at large; (c) ensure secure electronic data exchange between public 
health partners' computer systems; and (d) ensure protection of data, information, and 
systems, with adequate backup, organizational, and surge capacity to respond to 
bioterrorism and other public health threats and emergencies."19 A system to accomplish 
all of these requirements is far from simple and requires significant coordination and 
resources to implement. Health alerts are currently released as needed for network 
dissemination and utilize blocks of email addressees which are challenging and time-
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consuming to maintain as current. Recall rosters and checklists are incorporated into 
contingency plans and are utilized in the notification process for bioterrorism exercises or 
incidents, but the all-encompassing interactive and secure computer capability outlined 
by the CDC as ideal is not yet a reality. However, Louisiana has taken steps toward these 
goals through several efforts. The first is the pursuance of an active recall system of 
response personnel statewide in multiple arenas (vs. passive push of emails which may or 
may not be received in a timely manner)-law enforcement, military, disaster 
preparedness, medical and public health. Different systems are being evaluated which 
not only contact numbers entered into its system (repeatedly as necessary until success is 
achieved) but also record time of contact, so there is a record of whom has been ' I contacted and when it occurred. Services are available to contract or purchase and 
options are being explored to determine which best meet communications needs of the 
state in a cost effective manner. 
Another critical piece of this focus area is that of more traditional communications 
capability during disaster response which may also include loss of such services as 
traditional phone lines and cellular phone technology (both of which are also unreliable 
for purposes of secure communications). It was identified during the events surrounding 
September II, 2001, that communications between different response departments in 
New York City hindered efficient rescue efforts. This is by no means a unique situation 
between services in other states or even different branches of the military. This identified 
problem has been addressed by Louisiana with the allocation of funds and purchase of 
compatable statewide communications including contingency cell phones and tactical 
satellite communications systems and specially outfitted response vehicles and the 
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distribution of these resources to the different regions for training and rapid access as 
needed. Sufficient assets have been purchased for disaster preparedness, law 
enforcement, medical and public health teams, so that all essential players have access to 
compatible communications which also offer the required secure capability. Taking the 
communications concept even further was the establishment of a state public health 
emergency operations center (EOC) for efficient command and control, complete with a 
full in-place secure computer LAN and audiovisual support including secure 
communications capability and entry control, plus GIS capability for real-time case 
mapping and tracking. This truly state-of-the-art operations center, reminiscent of 
military "battlestaff centers" is poised to deliver not only the technical capability for 
communications dissemination, but also puts the appropriate personnel together in one 
location for efficient decision making and during-incident response and planning. This 
EOC is now operational and regional personnel are being familiarized with its 
capabilities and functions. This template has also been offered to the state's regions 
along with available funding if their plans meet state approval. 
Health 
The CDC's Focus Area A, Preparedness, Planning and Readiness Assessment directs 
states to "establish strategic leadership, direction, assessment, and coordination of 
activities (including Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) response) to ensure statewide 
readiness, interagency collaboration, local and regional preparedness (both intrastate and 
interstate) for bioterrorism, other outbreaks of infectious disease, and other public health 
threats and emergencies."19 Though certain aspects of this focus area were introduced 
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under other headings, it is worth looking at Louisiana's preparedness in the area of SNS. 
The planning effort required significant coordination with regional and local public 
health and medical personnel to set up the state receiving, staging and repackaging and 
distribution site, plus the regional points of distribution and local dispensing and 
treatment sites. The effort also required the formulation and training of response teams 
for those sites, the drafting of input to public health emergency operations plans including 
plans for incident inventory management and the maintenance of facilities, and the 
exercise and testing of team proficiency in carrying out developed plans. The system was 
then tested via a statewide exercise of mass vaccination clinics in which over 28,000 
childhood immunizations were administered in three days, achieving non-simulated L 
success in the face of a significant challenge. Maintaining high levels of preparedness for I 
this program will continue to take significant effort and Louisiana's bioterrorism office 
has one staff member assigned to oversee this critical program, but it takes the efforts of 
many team members across the state to continue to make inroads and keep abreast of the 
rapidly evolving status of this program at all levels. 20 
The CDC's Focus Area B, Surveillance and Epidemiology Capacity, requires that 
states "enable state and local health departments to enhance, design, and/or develop 
systems for rapid detection of unusual outbreaks of illness that may be the results of 
bioterrorism, other outbreaks of infectious disease, and other public health threats and 
emergencies. Assist the state and local health departments in establishing expanded 
epidemiologic capacity to investigate and mitigate such outbreaks ofillness."19 Public 
Health's role as "medical intelligence" gatherers is critical for the rapid detection and 
identification of a bioterrorism attack as a solid, pro-active disease surveillance system is 
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likely to be the first sign of such an attack--the earlier an attack is detected, the better a 
response is likely to be. Louisiana's integrated bioterrorism preparedness infrastructure 
with its multi-functional staff has the expertise to tap into and interpret emerging 
epidemiologic data and make sound decisions bases on that information-another key 
factor for a successful response. 
This case study of Louisiana's initiatives showcases their strong position for continued 
success, but there may still be a long way to go with no end in sight, as the "target" of 
preparedness is likely to be a moving one for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, this 
case study can serve as a model to build on for future improvement by other states, 
municipalities, agencies, or civilian institutions which may be facing similar challenges. 
Having access to solutions that have previously proven successful saves not only 
financial resources, but also valuable time and effort. 
LESSONS LEARNED/CONCLUSION 
The CDC has delivered, and continues to update, a framework of guidance for states 
to utilize in their efforts toward maximum bioterrorism preparedness as well as providing 
funding means which can be applied for by individual states in the form of grants. It 
establishes critical capabilities to be achieved and lays out specific elements of them 
broken down into two categories, critical and enhanced. 19 An interpretation of these 
guidelines is as follows: critical items represent minimum required goals to strive toward 
and should be first priority for resources and efforts, while enhanced capabilities are 
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those to be funded or established only when the critical requirements have been met. 
But, the CDC does not dictate how states should go about establishing bioterrorism 
preparedness capabilities, leaving states are free to develop means which best suit their 
individual needs or infrastructure. The success of Louisiana's efforts represents 
examples for other states to follow, but those efforts have also generated some lessons 
learned and key concepts for application in not only other states or at an organizational 
level, but internationally as well: 
Multi-level Collaborative Response 
Concerted efforts to bring multiple levels of government (local, regional, state and 
national) and the public up to speed in bioterrorism awareness and preparedness can be 
successful with appropriate efforts and resources diverted to meeting designated goals as 
set forth by the CDC and priorities of the individual state, though they may require 
getting past significant "growing pains" and establishing multi-level "buy in" on the part 
of different agencies or regions before a true change in established culture is achieved. 
Delineated Command/Joint Incident Response 
The concepts of a delineated command structure and a joint incident command system 
were key factors in Louisiana's success in putting infrastructure into place that poises 
them for an efficient and coordinated bioterrorism response. In times of emergency, an 
indisputable and recognized chain of command is crucial for a streamlined decision-
making process. A multi-functionaljoint or "unified" incidence response system is 
critical for a coordinated response locally--counterparts from different agencies need to 
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recognize each other as equal team players and learn to work together effectively prior to 
an actual incident via practice exercises of developed integrated response plans. 
Train as Planning to Execute 
A major advantage of planning, preparing and exercising involves familiarity with 
procedures as well as team functioning. Not at all inconsequential, the concept of"train 
like you will execute" has a long history of success and is one recognized as critical by 
response planners because it establishes a set, familiar pattern ofbehavior for personnel, 
which becomes the default in times of real-world stress and confusion. Merely knowing 
the names and faces of your contacts or ideally trusting them, plus being familiar with I what they know, their strengths, weaknesses and capabilities are a huge step forward in 
preparing for a contingency. Having recall rosters and numbers at close hand save huge 
amounts of time and effort and are critical to efficient response. The building of a sense 
of "team" goes a very, very long way to breaking down barriers to response and feelings 
ofterritorialism-building a sense of trust makes working together much more efficient 
in a real event. 
Critical Exercises 
Exercising developed plans is absolutely critical. The CDC has designated the following 
as an enhanced capability under its Focus Area G, Education and Training: "to provide 
directly or through other organizations, the ongoing systematic evaluation of the 
effectiveness of training, and the incorporation of lessons learned from performance 
during bioterrorism drills, simulations, other exercises, events, and evaluations of those 
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exercises."19 While this capability does not specifically mandate states to exercise, there 
are no realistic substitutes for this invaluable tool which provides a means to train as a 
team, assess the "real-world" implementation of written plans, and generate lessons 
learned and, therefore, a method to track performance progress. 
Communications 
Strong communications capability is critical. Not only must compatible communications 
systems be acquired, distributed and utilized by various response agencies for effective 
incident communications (to include secure capability), but the innovative utilization of 
an emergency operations center to operate as a "nerve center" for public health response 
(mirroring similar centers for other responses such as law enforcement, national guard, 
etc.) makes Louisiana's program a stand out. 
Redundant Assets 
Discussion generated in Louisiana's planning processes has identified that there is a 
possibility that when numerous assets are relied upon in disaster/contingency response 
plans, that the planned list of targeted personnel need to be carefully evaluated. There is 
a potential, if reserve or national guard personnel are counted upon for response activities 
(many response personnel have been identified as also holding guard or reserve 
positions), that an inadequate response will result in the event of a large scale military 
reserve/guard call-up such as seen in the recent Gulf region campaign. After assessment, 
it may be appropriate to build some redundant personnel assets into contingency plans or 
explore potential back-up alternatives. 
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The issue of how to prepare our nation, state by state, for a bioterrorism attack is 
extremely complex and rapidly changing as new information becomes available. It 
represents a unique and one of the most significant challenges ever faced by our society 
in its efforts to ensure everyone has a safe environment in which to live and work. It 
involves attempting to protect a vast and diverse population of those who could 
potentially be exposed. Recent hoax and real intentional releases of anthrax have resulted 
in drastic improvements to the response capability of our public health, medical and 
disaster response communities, the public and our nation as a whole, but we still have 
very far to go before beginning to back off efforts, if ever, because the threat also 
continues to evolve. 
The case study of Louisiana's response initiatives represents an invaluable model for 
others to emulate, but it is also merely a starting point. Further analyses of existing 
efforts in planning and exercising need to be pursued by our public health and medical 
communities at both government and civilian levels in order to ensure continued 
improvement in bioterrorism preparedness and emergency response capabilities. 
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Chancellor Moeser: 
Attached is a memorandum summarizing findings from a report of the National League 
of Nursing (NLN) addressing the reaccredidation ofthe Public Health Nursing 
curriculum in the School of Public Health. The Public Health Nursing curriculum 
includes two components, Public Health Nursing and Occupational Health Nursing. Both 
have been important parts of the history of service to the state and the nation that the 
School of Public health is known for. There is a very strong alumni base from these 
programs and US News and World Report has recently ranked us as the third highest 
Public Health Nursing Program in the nation. 
In 1997, the Masters of Public Health (MPH) degree in the Public Health Nursing 
curriculum was reformatted into the MPH in Public Health Leadership and was located 
within the newly formed, interdisciplinary, Public Health Leadership Program (PHLP) 
that encompasses four different concentrations at the masters and doctoral level. The 
public health nursing curriculum was expanded through the inclusion of separate 
concentrations and tracks for the various subspecialties now included in PHLP. The goal 
of all of these components is to emphasize leadership development for medical care and 
public health practitioners, including public health nurses. The program has grown 
substantially since 1997 by offering both residential and distance options to meet the 
demand for leadership training in many segments of the public health community and 
especially among physicians. It has enjoyed much success, as evidenced by high 
application and graduation rates. Ongoing evaluation ofthe program also supports this 
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fmding. The feedback from our students, indicates that the current curriculum and 
administration has met the needs of the nurses and other public health practitioners who 
have graduated from PHLP over the past six years. 
However, while the overall PHLP enrollment has grown, we have not seen increased 
enrollment in the public health nursing and occupational health nursing segment, except 
for a brief growth spurt, which occurred when we first introduced a distance format 
several years ago. We have maintained the integrity and quality of the nursing 
components of the program and have continued to include a core Public Health Nursing 
faculty, who also has expertise in public health practice and leadership. Efficiency has 
been optimized through the sharing of faculty and courses across various concentrations 
within the PHLP. Salary support for nursing faculty is drawn primarily from non-state 
sources, including federal grant funds from the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health. 
We are pleased that NLN has awarded us five years reaccredidation. After reviewing the 
areas for improvement in the NLN site visit report, the nursing facu1ty ofPHLP have 
made four recommendations, including the recommendation to recruit a full time head of 
the nursing program, who is a doctorally prepared Nurse Administrator. Since the NLN 
site visit PHLP has addressed this through the reappointment of a semi-retired faculty 
member as a part time (40%) manager of the Public Health Nursing track, and through 
the continued appointment of a tenured associate professor who serves as Director of the 
Occupational Health Nursing concentration (please see the attached organizational 
structure). Given the recent budget cuts and the shrinking nursing emolhnent, coupled 
with the increasing interdisciplinary needs of the Public Health Leadership Program, it is 
felt that these appointments are sufficient to meet the needs of nursing students and the 
intent of the NLN recommendations. No further administrative appointments in Public 
Health Nursing or Occupational Health nursing are planned at this time. Thus, I forward 
this letter as an addendum to the attached recommendations, from the NLN and the 
Public Health Nursing faculty, to describe the background of these issues and to clarifY 
the decision that no further hiring will be considered at this time. Please let me know if 
you would like further information on this matter. 
io--
